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Abstract
How do ﬁrms adjust prices in the marketplace? Do they tend to adjust prices infrequently in
response to changes in market conditions? If so, why? These remain key questions in
macroeconomics, particularly for central banks that work to keep inﬂation low and stable. The
authors use the Bank of Canada’s 2002–03 price-setting survey data to investigate Canadian
ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour; they also analyze the micro foundations for the ﬁrms’ pricing
behaviour using count data and probit models. The authors ﬁnd that, all else being equal, ﬁrms
tend to adjust prices more frequently if they are state-dependent price-setters, operate in the trade
sector, or have large variable costs or more direct competitors. There are various sticky-price
theories; in the Bank’s price-setting survey, the senior management of ﬁrms were read a simple
statement in non-technical language that paraphrased each sticky-price theory, and were then
asked whether the statement applied to their ﬁrm. The most frequently recognized sticky-price
theories are customer relations, cost-based pricing, and coordination failure. The authors’ analysis
indicates that if ﬁrms recognize coordination failure on price increases, sticky information, menu
costs, factor stability, or customer relations as being important, they tend to adjust prices less
frequently. The authors also ﬁnd that the patterns discernible within ﬁrms’ recognition of sticky-
price theories are strongly associated with ﬁrms’ micro foundations.
JEL classiﬁcation: D40, E30, L11
Bank classiﬁcation: Inﬂation and prices; Transmission of monetary policy
Résumé
Comment les entreprises révisent-elles leurs prix sur le marché? Sont-elles portées à ne les
ajuster qu’à l’occasion, lorsque les conditions du marché changent? Et si oui, pourquoi? Ces
questions demeurent fondamentales en macroéconomie, en particulier pour les banques centrales,
qui s’efforcent de maintenir l’inﬂation à un niveau bas et stable. Les auteurs étudient le
comportement des entreprises en matière de prix en se servant des résultats de l’enquête que la
Banque du Canada a menée à ce sujet en 2002-2003. Ils analysent également les fondements
microéconomiques de ce comportement en recourant à des modèles de comptage et à des modèles
probits. Ils constatent que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, les entreprises ont tendance à ajuster
leurs prix plus fréquemment si elles ont pour habitude de se livrer à des révisions dictées par l’état
du marché, si elles appartiennent au secteur du commerce, ou encore si elles ont des coûts
variables importants ou un nombre relativement élevé de concurrents directs. Diverses hypothèsesiv
sont susceptibles d’expliquer la rigidité des prix. Dans le cadre de l’enquête de la Banque sur les
comportements en matière de prix, un membre de la haute direction de l’entreprise sondée se
voyait présenter des énoncés simples correspondant à ces différentes hypothèses et devait indiquer
si chacun s’appliquait à la situation de sa ﬁrme. Les facteurs de rigidité des prix les plus souvent
cités ont été les relations avec la clientèle, les coûts ainsi que la non-coordination des
modiﬁcations des prix. L’étude montre que les ﬁrmes qui considèrent la non-coordination des
changements de prix, la rigidité de l’information, les coûts d’étiquetage ou les relations avec la
clientèle comme importants sont moins enclines à réviser souvent leurs prix. Les auteurs
observent par ailleurs que le proﬁl des facteurs de rigidité des prix reconnus par les entreprises est
étroitement lié aux caractéristiques microéconomiques de ces dernières.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D40, E30, L11
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Inﬂation et prix; Transmission de la politique monétaire1  1 
1  Why Study Price-Setting Behaviour?  
 
How do firms adjust prices in the marketplace? Do they tend to adjust prices infrequently in 
response to changes in market conditions? If so, why? These remain key questions in 
macroeconomics,  particularly for central banks that work to keep inflation low and stable. Given 
the importance of these questions, it should not be surprising that many sticky-price theories have 
been proposed to explain sluggish price adjustment. As demonstrated in recent studies by de 
Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2004) and Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2006), the way in which 
price-setting behaviour is modelled in macroeconomic analysis can significantly influence the way 
in which inflation dynamics unfold, and can significantly influence social welfare changes in 
response to exogenous shocks. Therefore, it is critical to find out which sticky-price theories can 
best explain actual price-setting behaviour.  
To understand the price-setting behaviour of Canadian firms, following the framework of 
Blinder et al. (1998), the Bank of Canada designed a price-setting survey (PSS) and from  
2002–03 conducted person-to-person interviews with the senior management of 170 firms. Using 
the PSS data, Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), in a spirit similar to that of Blinder et al. 
(1998), identify two phenomena: (i) a wide variation in how often firms set prices, and (ii) 
significant differences in the importance of various price-setting theories to firms’ pricing 
behaviour. This paper attempts to build models to further explain these two phenomena. More 
specifically, we estimate count data models (negative binomial regression models) to explain the 
wide variation in the frequency of price adjustment among Canadian firms, and employ discrete-
choice models (ordered probit and probit models) to evaluate the roles of, and the micro 
foundations for, prevailing sticky-price theories based on the Canadian PSS data. These models 
allow us to identify the marginal effects of firm-specific and market characteristics on price-2  2 
adjustment behaviour, and identify the factors that motivate firms to select a given sticky-price-
setting behaviour or a combination of such behaviour. This work will help us understand Canadian 
firms’ price-setting behaviour, and therefore provide useful information on how to model this 
behaviour in macroeconomic analysis.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the recent 
literature on price-adjustment behaviour and review the existing sticky-price theories. We 
introduce the PSS data in section 3. In section 4 we examine the model of price-adjustment 
frequency using the count data models, and present the empirical results. In section 5 we analyze 
the different sticky-price theories using discrete-choice models, and highlight the regression 
results. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
 
2  Recent Evidence of Pricing Behaviour  
How often do firms adjust their prices? Why do some firms change prices more often than others? 
Which sticky-price theory is best supported by the empirical evidence? These questions have been 
the focal point of recent empirical work.  
       
2.1  Can we explain sticky prices? 
Many sticky-price theories have been proposed in the literature to explain the infrequent 
adjustment of prices to economic shocks. However, these theories were tested based on the prices 
of individual goods and services with no reference to the behaviour of individual firms (Cecchetti 
1986; Carlton 1989), until Blinder’s (1991) approach was proposed and applied to the firm-level 
survey data of the United States. This work has been followed by research based on firm-level 
PSSs involving twelve central banks around the world (Table 1). In contrast to the macroeconomic 
models that feature highly flexible and frequently adjusted prices, the existing firm-based PSSs 3  3 
and corresponding research demonstrate that prices are indeed sticky, with a varying 
lifespan/duration within and across countries (Table 2). In addition to the findings from the firm-
level studies, some economists have adopted the product/service-based approach to gain additional 
insight into the sticky-price phenomenon (Table 3).  
  Why do prices demonstrate varying degrees of stickiness? The literature suggests, although 
not unanimously, that these variations may reflect some common factors, such as firm size; firm 
industry or sector; long-term contracts; the level of competition; specific events that trigger price 
adjustment, known as pricing triggers; and, perhaps most importantly, the role of firm-recognized 
sticky-price theories (Fabiani et al. 2005; Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). But the literature 
has not resolved how firm-specific factors and market characteristics jointly affect firms’ price-
adjustment frequency. We attempt to resolve this question to better understand the pricing 
behaviour of Canadian firms.  
  Before describing our data (section 3) and estimating our count data model (section 4), we 
provide a brief summary of the existing sticky-price theories used in both our count data model 
and our discrete-choice model. 
 
2.2  Which sticky-price theories are widely recognized? 
Another aim of this paper is to analyze why firms recognize some sticky-price theories but not 
others. Below, we review the eleven sticky-price theories evaluated in the PSS.
1  
                                                   
1 In the Canadian survey, the senior management of firms were read a simple statement in non-technical language that 
represented each sticky-price theory, and then were asked, “Does this statement apply to your firm?” For the first six 
theories, firms had to answer Yes, very important, fairly important, or slightly important, or No, unimportant. For the 
remaining five theories, firms simply answered important or unimportant (Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). 
Because of the differences in allowable responses, in section 5 we estimate a series of both ordered probit and probit 
models. For reporting purposes, we divide these theories into two groups (see sections 3 and 5). Note that the answers 
were not mutually exclusive. 4  4 
The first theory, known as the sticky-information theory, suggests that prices adjust to 
economic shocks with some lag because the information used to review (and ultimately change) 
prices is available infrequently. The second and third theories, coordination failure theory on price 
decline and coordination failure theory on price increase, respectively, suggest that firms will 
delay price adjustments (downward or upward) because they fear that, by initiating a price change, 
they would initiate a price war or reduce market share (Clower 1965; Cooper and John 1988; Ball 
and Romer 1991). The fourth theory, cost-based pricing, suggests that prices are 
determined mainly by production costs and that delays in cost-push inflation in the multi-stage 
production processes generate aggregate price-level inertia (Gordon 1981; Blanchard 1983).  The 
fifth and sixth theories are the explicit and implicit contract theories, respectively, which suggest 
that formal or informal contracts set between buyers and sellers can fix nominal prices over some 
horizon (Okun 1981). Generally, buyers and sellers sign contracts to gain certainty, limit risk, and 
lower search costs that result in price stickiness. The seventh theory is the menu costs theory, 
which suggests that firms will delay price adjustment because there is a non-negligible fixed cost 
for changing prices (Barro 1972).
2 The eighth theory, the non-price competition theory, argues that 
market clearing may take place because of factors other than prices, such as delivery time, quality, 
and warranty (Carlton 1989).  
The ninth, tenth and eleventh theories are evaluated only in the Canadian price-setting 
survey. The ninth theory is the factor stability theory, which suggests that prices do not need to 
change more often because the firm considers the factors that determine prices to be relatively 
stable (Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). The tenth theory, the low-inflation theory, argues 
that firms adjust their prices less frequently because a low, stable, and predictable inflation 
                                                   
2 Blinder et al. (1998) add the idea of the time and effort required to collect information. Amirault, Kwan, and 
Wilkinson (2006) and Fabiani et al. (2005) use the traditional definition of the theory. Wolman (2000) gives an 
excellent literature review of this theory. 5  5 
environment makes real price adjustments more noticeable to customers (Engel 1993; Amirault, 
Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). The eleventh theory is the customer relations theory, which suggests 
that firms do not respond to cost and demand shocks because of their concern for customer 
relations (Okun 1981; Rotemberg 2002, 2004).  
Which sticky-price theories are most commonly recognized by firms? The existing 
literature indicates that coordination failure on a price increase or decline, cost-based pricing, and 
explicit and implicit contracts are the most commonly recognized theories in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, nine EU countries, and Canada. The U.S. study, based on 
regression analysis, also concludes that coordination failure and implicit contracts are important 
for explaining price stickiness (Blinder et al. 1998). Interestingly, five of the eleven sticky-price 
theories mentioned above have not been evaluated in terms of firms’ micro foundations in the 
existing literature. No studies similar to Blinder et al. (1998) have been conducted on the recent 
Canadian PSS data. This paper aims to fill that void. 
 
3  Canadian Price-Setting Survey Data 
In this section, we first describe the key features of the Bank of Canada’s 2002–03 PSS and we 
then explain the two key variables of this research: (i) the frequency of price adjustment, and (ii) 
the ranking given to each sticky-price theory by the firms surveyed.  
 
3.1  The price-setting survey  
The PSS data were collected by the Bank from 170 private, for-profit, unregulated, and non-
commodity-producing firms across Canada that represent the Canadian economy in terms of 
industry sector, firm size, and, to some extent, regional distribution. This survey can provide 
reasonable insight into the price-setting behaviour of Canadian firms (Amirault, Kwan, and 6  6 
Wilkinson 2006). Note, however, that the survey method is somewhat limited; it inherently has 
potential biases, limiting the degree to which statistical inference can be made in our analysis (see 
Appendix A).  
Nevertheless, the Canadian PSS has many merits. First, its design takes advantage of the 
findings from the U.S. and the U.K. surveys by utilizing the previously well-received and better-
defined questions (such as the theory rankings), while discarding those questions that are difficult 
to interpret (such as questions about marginal cost that firms have difficulty answering) (Amirault, 
Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). Second, because the Canadian PSS data were collected in face-to-
face interviews, surveyors were able to resolve respondents’ questions and minimize 
misinterpretations. As a result, this data series does not contain any missing values (thereby 
differing from Blinder et al. 1998 and Fabiani et al. 2005); all questions were answered by small, 
medium, and large firms in various industries. This rich data set permits a detailed investigation 
that was not possible previously. 
  The Canadian PSS data contain descriptions of each firm’s price-setting behaviour, 
features, and business environment. The information includes the firm’s cost structure, product 
distribution, sales under contracts, and roles in setting prices (Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B 
provide variable definitions and descriptions).  
  Prior to introducing our models, we present the dependent variable in our count data model 
(the frequency of price adjustment) and the data collected on firms’ rankings of the various price-
setting theories used in both estimations (explained in sections 4 and 5). 
 
3.2  How often do firms change prices? 
 
The first key variable of interest in this research is that of the price-setting frequency of Canadian 
firms, which records how many times these firms actually adjusted their prices in the past twelve 7  7 
months. As Figure 1 shows, 8 per cent did not change prices at all in the past twelve months,  
27 per cent of the firms changed prices once, 18 per cent of the firms changed prices more than 
52 times, and 6 per cent of the firms changed prices 365 times. The median number of price 
changes is four times a year. Unlike many other economic variables, this variable takes on integer 
values greater than or equal to zero, with a large number of firms making fewer than two price 
changes per year, and a smaller number making highly frequent price changes within the same 
period. The distribution of this variable is bounded at zero and stretched to the right, giving a clear 
sign of a non-normal distribution. Figure 1 shows that this distribution is very similar to that found 
by Blinder et al. (1998) for their U.S. study. The high price-adjustment frequency at the firm level 
indicates that the statistics on price-adjustment frequency that are based on the monthly CPI data 
for products/services are likely to underestimate the actual frequency of price adjustment: because 
the CPI data are collected monthly, they may well be incomplete or right censored.  
 
3.3  Firms’ evaluations of sticky-price theories 
The second key variable of interest in this research is the ranking of each of the eleven sticky-price 
theories from the firm’s point of view. According to Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), cost-
based pricing (67 per cent) and customer relations (55 per cent) are viewed as the most important 
factors that influence price-setting, while explicit contracts (45 per cent), non-price competition 
(44 per cent), and coordination failure on a price increase (41 per cent) are ranked as considerably 
more important than the remaining six theories. At the other extreme, theories pertaining to menu 
costs (21 per cent) and sticky information (14 per cent) appear to be less important in price-
setting.
3  
                                                   
3 In particular, the highly recognized cost-based pricing theory coincides with the finding of Fabiani et al. (2005) that 
many firms have a markup type formula in their pricing. Blinder et al. (1998), Hall, Walsh, and Yates (2000) and 
Apel, Fribera, and Hallsten (2000) all have similar rankings. 8  8 
In the Canadian PSS, the rankings of six of the eleven theories are recorded as ordinal 
multinomial responses, such as 0, 1, 2,  and 3, whereas those of the remaining five theories are 
recorded as binary responses, such as 0, 1 (Table 4).
4,5 For example, firms were read the following 
statement that describes cost-based pricing: “Prices depend mainly on the costs of labour and raw 
materials used in producing goods and services. Therefore, prices don’t change until costs 
change.”  Firms were then asked whether this statement was very, fairly, or slightly important to 
their company, or unimportant. For the remaining five of the eleven theories, firms were asked 
only to choose whether the statement was “important” or “unimportant.” In Amirault, Kwan, and 
Wilkinson (2006), if a firm indicated that a statement was important to the company, it was 
interpreted as meaning that the firm recognized the corresponding sticky-price theory as a 
description of the firm’s behaviour.  
As noted previously, the one key variable, the frequency of price adjustment, is regarded as 
count data (how many times the price has been adjusted in the past twelve months), while another 
set of key variables, the rankings of sticky-price theories, are measured as either ordinal 
multinomial or binary responses (ranging from totally unimportant to slightly, fairly, or very 
important). Because the classical linear regression framework cannot accommodate the count data 
and ordinal multinomial/binary response data, this research will use count data models for the 
former, and probit and ordered probit models for the latter.  
 
                                                   
4 For practical purposes, we divide the eleven theories into two groups: the theories that have ordinal multinomial 
responses are referred to as group one, and the theories that have binary responses are referred to as group two.  
5 Very few firms (7 of 170) found the sticky-information theory very or fairly important. To estimate the ordered 
probit model for the sticky-information theory would be technically possible but not desirable, since the model lacks 
sufficient observations for certain responses. Hence, for this theory, we convert multinomial responses to binary 
responses and consider the probit model rather than the ordered probit model. 9  9 
4  Modelling Price-Adjustment Frequency   
In the existing literature, little attention is paid to modelling the price-adjustment frequency in 
terms of firms’ features, business environments, and the recognition of various sticky-price 
theories. In our study, we use the Canadian PSS data to determine which factors influence the 
price-adjustment frequency at the firm level. In this section, we provide the motivation for using 
the negative binomial regression model, discuss our covariate selection process, and present the 
estimation results. In section 5, we evaluate the rankings of the eleven sticky-price theories.  
 
4.1  Model and specification 
4.1.1  Factors affecting the price-adjustment frequency  
Some of the potential explanatory variables for price-adjustment frequency that we use are 
common – variable cost, firm size (number of employees), industry type, competition, contract 
utilization, customer types, and product destinations – but other explanatory variables are unique 
to this research. First, we include in our model pricing triggers (variables to trigger a price change 
by the firm), which are regular price changes (time-dependent pricing); wage changes; price 
changes of domestic inputs; changes in taxes, fees, or other costs; competitors’ price changes; 
exchange rate changes; changes in demand conditions; and changes in economic forecasts, sales 
campaigns, and parent company directives/incentives. Second, we add to our model the variables 
that capture the relevancy of the eleven price-setting theories to firms’ price-setting behaviour. 
Third, we consider a set of unique market structure variables found only in the Canadian PSS, such 
as information lags in price-setting information, price leadership, price leadership in the industry, 10  10 
and buyer concentration (Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B provide variable definitions and 
descriptions).
6  
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we evaluate a set of linear and non-parametric 
pairwise correlations between our variable of interest and each of the potential explanatory 
variables.
7 The basic statistics show that region, industry type, firm size, contract utilization, 
competition, price leadership, sales destination, and state-dependent pricing are correlated with 
price-adjustment frequency. In addition, price-adjustment frequency is significantly correlated 
with some sticky-price theories. While it is useful to explore the pairwise relationship between the 
price-adjustment frequency and each of its plausible determinants, as in Amirault, Kwan, and 
Wilkinson (2006), this is not sufficient, since it ignores other important determinants and may 
produce spurious correlation relationships that lead to inaccurate inference. A more desirable 
strategy is to consider a large set of covariates that affect the price-adjustment frequency jointly.  
 
4.1.2  Count data model (negative binomial regression model) 
Because our variable of interest, the price-adjustment frequency, takes on non-negative integers 
and demonstrates the properties of a count process, we use count data models that can 
accommodate the non-negativity and non-normality of frequency data, and link the data to a set of 
covariates. 
  The simplest count data model is the Poisson regression. Let  i y  be a draw from the Poisson 
distributed random variable,  i Y .  Let  i x  be a  1 · k  column vector of ith observations of k  
                                                   
6 Several other variables are used in Bils and Klenow (2004) (raw vs. processed products, and import share), Dhyne et 
al. (2004) (seasonality, outlet type, taxes, and product-specific inflation), and Blinder et al. (1998) (hierarchical delays 
theory recognition, judging quality by price theory recognition, and cycle sensitivity), but are not available in the 
Canadian PSS. 
7 All basic statistical results are available upon request. 11  11 
independent variables. In this case, the probability of   i Y   given  i x  follows the Poisson distribution 
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 for   K , 2 , 1 , 0 = i  . Here,   (,) iii mmb = x  , the most-used functional form of which is  
exp() ii mb ¢ = x , 
 or  
ln ii mb ¢ = x , 
where b is a  k x 1 column vector of parameters. It can be shown that the expected number of 
counts per period is  
(|)exp(), iii Ey b ¢ = xx   
which is identical to the variance of the number of counts per period:  
(|)exp(). iii Vary b ¢ = xx  
The equal dispersion imposes a strong restriction to the Poisson regression model. The Poisson 
regression model can be estimated by the maximum-likelihood method, assuming that the 
observations are identically, independently distributed and the model is correctly specified. The 




















(6a) 12  12 
This implies that, to interpret the estimation results, the sign of the parameters can be interpreted in 
terms of the direction of the impacts of the independent variables. But, to give quantitative 
information on the marginal impact of one particular independent variable within  i x  on the 
expected value of counts,  i y  , the corresponding beta estimate must be multiplied by the expected 
counts per period for  i y  . However, it is more convenient to examine factor change in  (|) i Ey i x . 
Let  ik x  be the kth variable in  i x  and let  d  be a small change (say, 1 d = ); then, the factor change 
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x .  In our analysis, we use equation (6b) to interpret 
our count model results. 
  The equal dispersion is considered the major restriction of the Poisson regression model. 
The negative binomial regression model – the most common alternative count data model – is 
more general than the Poisson regression model, and can accommodate cross-section 
heterogeneity. The key change from the Poisson regression model to the negative binomial model 
is to add a term,  i e , to  ib ¢ x , so that  
ln iii mbe ¢ = + x , 
where ln ii mb ¢¢ = x  ( i m¢ ln  was defined as  i m ln  in the Poisson regression model) and  i i u e = ln . 
With this additional structure, the distribution of  i y  conditional on  i x  and  i u  is also the Poisson 
distribution with conditional mean and variance i m :  
(7) 













= i x  
However, the distribution of  i u  must be specified. The most common practice is to assume that the 
distribution is the gamma distribution with an additional dispersion parameter a  for  ) exp( i i u e = .  
The variance of  ) exp( i e  is normalized to 1,  1 )] [exp( = i Var e , to make the model identified. It can 
be shown that, with this normalization and the gamma distribution for  i u ,  (|,) iii fyu x  becomes 
the negative binomial distribution with dispersion parameter a . If  0 = a , the negative binomial 
regression model becomes the Poisson regression model. The larger the value of a , the greater the 
dispersion of  y . The negative binomial regression model can be estimated by the maximum-
likelihood method. It provides the estimates for  b  and a , and standard errors of these estimates. 
It is possible to use the likelihood-ratio test to verify whether  0 = a .    
  To model the price-adjustment frequency, we must consider which explanatory variables 
should be included in our model.
8 In keeping with the preliminary statistical analysis and existing 
findings in the literature, we include the following variables: region, industry type, the number of 
employees, variable cost, firm size, number of competitors, contract utilization, price leadership, 
and information delays.  Although buyer concentration, product destination, and consumer type are 
largely insignificant in the preliminary statistical analysis, we still consider them in our model on a 
theoretical basis. In addition, we include the dummy variables for the “very important” response 
for all ordinal response theories in the first group and all pricing triggers. Lastly, we include the 
binary variables for the five theories in the second group in our model.  
  In addition, because there are a large number of categorical explanatory variables in the 
model, we need to find a baseline case against which the estimated coefficients of the model can 
                                                   
8 Scale variables have been standardized to make the model a better fit. 
(8) 14  14 
be interpreted as marginal effects. The baseline case chosen is a firm in British Columbia’s service 
sector; it has an average number of employees (about 2,800), operates in an industry without a 
price leader, has about half of its sales contracted, and has about 30 direct competitors. This firm 
also has no information delays (less than 24 hours), and about 60 per cent of its sales are to other 
businesses in its home region. The firm indicated that regular price adjustments are very important, 
and that they are therefore a time-dependent price-setter. Lastly, less than 10 per cent of this 
baseline firm’s sales are to its top five buyers, and the firm believes that neither sticky-price theory 
nor a pricing trigger is very important.  
 
4.2  Empirical findings 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the count data models. The unrestricted negative binomial 
regression model is shown in column 3, the restricted model
9 in column 4, and the marginal effect 
of a unit change (see equation (6b)) on the number of yearly price adjustments in column 5. 
Overdispersion in each model is indicated by the level of significance of the constant alpha term at 
the bottom of the table. An alpha significantly different from zero indicates overdispersion. This 
occurs in all cases and, therefore, we can conclude that the negative binomial regression model is a 
suitable choice.  
In our unrestricted model, we find that a firm’s size, region, industry type, customer type, 
and product destination are all highly significant. Other significant variables include several 
theories and pricing triggers, and state-dependent price-setters. Cost structure, buyer concentration, 
competitors, and contracted sales are less significant.   
                                                   
9 The restricted model is selected by eliminating all insignificant variables from the unrestricted model, and estimating 
based on likelihood-ratio tests. 15  15 
The restricted model (Table 5, column 4) keeps many explanatory variables that are 
statistically significant in the unrestricted model. Akaike's information criterion (denoted “aic” in 
Table 5, column 2) for the restricted model is lower than that for the unrestricted model. The 
likelihood-ratio test between the restricted and the unrestricted model does not reject the 
specification of the restricted model.  
 
4.2.1  Marginal effects 
Based on the estimation results of the restricted model, we report the marginal effects associated 
with the parameter estimates in column 5 of Table 5. The marginal effect associated with each 
coefficient estimate has an intuitive interpretation. If an explanatory variable changes by a unit, the 
marginal effect gives the additional number of adjustments per year in prices; in other words, the 
marginal effect is the change in the estimated counts triggered by a change in the features or 
behaviour of firms from our baseline case. In this estimation, our baseline case would adjust prices 
four or five times per year, close to the Canadian PSS sample mean of four. In the restricted 
model, the variables for variable costs, product destination, consumer type, contract utilization, 
and competitors are standardized. Hence, when these variables have a one-standard-deviation 
change, the marginal effect represents the additional price-adjustment count. For example, an 
increase of one standard deviation (about 26 per cent) in a firm’s variable cost as a proportion of 
their total cost would increase the count by twice a year, relative to our baseline case of four or 
five times a year. The summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 6. 
  The estimation results of the count model indicate that a wide range of factors influence the 
price-adjustment frequency by Canadian firms. The estimation results also provide quantitative 
evidence of the substantial role played by most important factors in Canada. In Table 5, the 
variables highlighted in dark grey have a marginal effect greater than three additional adjustments 16  16 
per year, and the variables highlighted in light grey have a marginal effect of between one and 
three additional adjustments per year. The remaining variables in column 5 are still statistically 
important, but to a lesser extent. We make the following detailed observations about the estimated 
marginal effects. 
First, if a firm is involved in retail or wholesale trade, is located in Ontario or Quebec, uses 
contracts, or is a state-dependent price adjustor, it tends to adjust prices about five times more per 
year than our baseline case; that is, these firms change prices twice as often as the baseline case. 
Second, supplier type (sellers to other domestic customers and exporters), wage and input costs 
changes, information delays, price leadership, and several sticky-price theories (menu costs, factor 
stability, customer relations, sticky information, and coordination failure on a price increase) all 
have a moderate impact of less than three additional price adjustments per year in response to a 
marginal change. Third, the market structure affects the price-adjustment frequency. The largest 
impact comes from the number of competitors: if this number rises by one standard deviation 
around the mean, then the price-adjustment frequency increases by more than thirty times a year. 
This translates roughly into three additional adjustments per year for every ten additional direct 
competitors.
10   
 
5  Evaluations of Sticky-Price Theories 
In this section, we first analyze the relationship among rankings assigned to various sticky-price 
theories and then examine how the ranking of each theory is related to microeconomic foundations 
at the firm level.  
                                                   
10 Since the marginal effects presented in the count model are the estimated effects of a change from our baseline case, 
we provide the results from an alternative model in Appendix C. This alternative model uses a different baseline case 
as a robustness check to our interpretation of the estimated coefficients’ direction and magnitude.   17  17 
 5.1  Patterns of sticky-price theory evaluation  
We first consider correlations and tests of independence among the various rankings of the 
theories, to gain some insight into whether the rankings are necessarily mutually exclusive.
 For 
example, firms might indicate that they hold back on a price increase prior to any action of their 
competitors (coordination failure) because they fear antagonizing customers (customer relations).  
  Firms were asked whether any of the eleven sticky-price theories applied to their business, 
and, if so, how important it was to their pricing behaviour (Table 4); we divide the responses into 
two groups of theories: the four possible ordinal multinomial responses (from very important to 
unimportant) are group one, and the binary responses (important or unimportant) are group two. 
To calculate the correlations between all eleven theories, we adopt two methods. First, we use the 
Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation coefficients
11 to measure the correlations between every pair 
of theories in the first group, and between first and second group theories. Second, we tabulate the 
Pearson chi-squared tests of independence between every pair of theories in the second group. 
Below, we highlight some of the main results from this exercise.  
We find that many of the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations are relatively small in 
value, and that all but one of the significant correlation coefficients are positive.
12 This suggests 
that many of these theories recognized by the Canadian firms are possible complements, or at least 
not mutually exclusive. Coordination failure on a price increase and explicit contracts are the only 
negatively correlated theories, and implicit contracts and customer relations are highly correlated 
theories.  
                                                   
11 This method is suggested and used by Blinder et al. (1998). This correlation coefficient takes into account the 
ordinal nature of the data. We can interpret it roughly as a regular correlation coefficient, since its value is bounded 
between zero and one; see Goodman and Kruskal (1954). Alternatively, we could have used Spearman’s non-
parametric rank test for independence – the results are almost identical. These results are available upon request.  
12 All basic statistical results are available upon request. 18  18 
In addition, we find that the correlation between coordination failure on a price decline and 
coordination failure on a price increase is positive and strong. We note a near-zero correlation 
between explicit and implicit contracts, which is inconsistent with Blinder et al.’s (1998) finding 
that the two theories are net substitutes. We find that, among the theories in the second group, the 
recognition of customer relations and factor stability are strong complements to other theories, 
suggesting that they are used by firms in combination with other practices. The interdependent 
relations among low inflation, factor stability, and non-price competition point to the difficulty in 
changing sticky prices, because price changes are more noticeable (either because of low inflation, 
economic stability, or competition), which may disturb customer relations. We also note that non-
price competition and factor stability are not significantly correlated with any first-group theories. 
  Overall, we find that many price-setting theories are not likely mutually exclusive and may 
even be complementary. Our findings suggest that customer relations and cost-based pricing are 
perhaps the most complementary.  
 
5.2  Model and specification 
In this section, we identify firm and industry characteristics that explain the relative importance of 
sticky-price theories to the firm. To do so, we identify and evaluate potential explanatory variables 
that can explain the rankings of sticky-price theories in the framework of probit and ordered probit 
models. 
 
5.2.1  Factors affecting the rankings  
We consider the following variables that may influence a firm’s ranking of a given sticky-price 
theory:  firm size, industry type, variable cost, state-dependent pricing, competition, sales 
destinations, contract utilization (per cent of sales under contract), recognition of other sticky-price 19  19 
theories,
13 pricing triggers, buyer concentration, information delay, price leadership, and region 
(tables are available upon request).  
 
5.2.2  Probit and ordered probit models 
In addition to probit models that can be made from binary choices, the ordered probit model is 
suitable to where there are two or more ordered choices represented by integers. For simplicity, we 
let the number of the ordered integer choices be three. This model can be derived from the 




* ¢ =~ + x  
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where  2 1 a a <  is required for these threshold parameters to make  i Y  observable. 
Note that vector  i x  in equation (9) does not need to contain a constant. If it had a constant 
as one of its elements, we would have an intercept term; say,  1 b . In this case, the revised decision 























                                                   
13 Given our findings in the previous section, we have decided to include these variables in our model. Admittedly, 
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That is, we really cannot identify the threshold parameters. It seems reasonable that we should use 
the simplest way to deal with this problem by forcing  i x  to be a vector of variables with no 
constant term. If this solution is adopted, then the number of thresholds (e.g.,  1 a and  2 a ) is the 
number of ordered choices (e.g.,  2 , 1 , 0 = i Y ) minus one. For example, if  1 , 0 = i Y , we will return to 
the case of the binary probit model. The parameters such as b ,  1 a , and  2 a  can be estimated by the 
maximum-likelihood method. 
  Our baseline case for both the probit and ordered probit models is the same as in our count 
data model (see section 4.1.2), except for a more specific industry classification: the baseline case 
here is a firm in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector, instead of the service sector 
aggregate, because the rankings seem to differ significantly within larger sectoral aggregates. 
 
5.3  Empirical findings 
In this section, we analyze the estimation results for all eleven sticky-price theories. These 
estimation results are for the selected models identified via the model selection process (as 
explained in section 4.2). Table 7 reports the estimation results for five ordered probit models, and 
Table 8 the estimation results for six probit models. The likelihood-ratio tests (called the “chi-
squared test” in the tables) and log-likelihood functions are provided in the last row of the tables.  
By examining the estimated coefficients of these models, we attempt to answer the following two 
questions: (i) for all eleven theories, what firm and market characteristics constitute the micro 
foundations in the broader Canadian context?, and (ii) for each theory, what are the statistically 
significant firm and market characteristics that serve as micro foundations for firms’ subscription 
to the theory? We shall discuss the answers to these questions in turn. 
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5.3.1  Most important factors common to all sticky-price theories 
The results reported in Tables 7 and 8 show that the variables that constitute the common micro 
foundations of all existing sticky-price theories are as follows: industry type, customer type 
(households, government, or businesses), product destination (domestic or export), information 
availability, and contract utilization. Region, buyer concentration, state- vs. time-dependent 
pricing, recognition of competitor price change, and exchange rate changes are also important 
factors. In general, our results suggest that these characteristics influence firms’ choice of a sticky-
price theory as a suitable explanation for their price-setting behaviour.  
As noted previously, the above factors not only affect firms’ recognition of various sticky-
price theories, but also affect their price-adjustment behaviour and hence their price-adjustment 
frequencies. Together, these factors constitute the micro foundations of firms’ price-setting 
behaviour and beliefs.  
 
5.3.2  Firm features and sticky-price theories   
Tables 7 and 8 report the results for the discrete-choice models. Instead of presenting all 
significant variables for each of the eleven models, we highlight the most interesting results from 
our analysis. 
   
Coordination failure (on a price decline or increase) 
Consistent with the Goodman-Kruskal correlation results, similar factors trigger the recognition of 
both coordination failure theories: firm size, industry type (construction; retail trade; commercial, 
personal, and business services; information, culture, and transportation), responsiveness to price 
changes by competitors, and the presence of industry price leaders. 22  22 
  As noted previously, firms’ recognition of coordination failure on price increases, and not 
on price declines, explains the low frequency of price adjustment. We would therefore expect to 
find asymmetry in the factors that explain the relative importance of these theories. As shown in 
Table 7, firms that operate in the manufacturing sector or make a high proportion of their sales to 
households are less likely to recognize coordination failure on a price decline, and do not appear in 
the other coordination failure model.   
These results confirm the findings of Blinder et al. (1998) and Amirault, Kwan, and 
Wilkinson (2006) that coordination failure is not universally recognized and its impact depends on 
whether prices decline or increase. Further, we find that firms that recognize coordination failure 
theories are more responsive to competitors’ price changes and regard cost-based pricing and 
customer relations as very important. These results are evidently consistent with a very 
competitive market, where coordination failure may still occur. 
 
Cost-based pricing  
The results from the cost-based pricing model suggest that firms with a higher proportion of 
variable costs recognize cost-based pricing as being more important to their business (all else held 
constant). The results also suggest that firms selling more than 50 per cent of their output to the top 
five buyers prefer to use the cost-based pricing approach to set prices. Both of these firm-specific 
characteristics are a natural fit for cost-based pricing firms. What is likely to trigger a price change 
for these firms? If a firm changes prices in response to changes in their wage bills, domestic 
inputs, or foreign exchange, they are more likely to recognize this theory as an important 
explanation for their pricing behaviour.   
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  Two prominent factors serve as the micro foundations of this theory: (i) firms that 
recognize cost-based pricing are sensitive to cost changes (wages bills, domestic inputs, and 
foreign exchange movements) in triggering price adjustments, and (ii) these firms are also more 
likely to be time-dependent price-setters who are reflecting regular price-reviewing practices.  
 
Explicit and implicit contracts 
For the explicit and implicit contract theories, the common significant factors are cost-based 
pricing, customer relations, and, to a lesser extent, menu costs, all of which lead to price rigidity. 
We find that retail trade does not consider the explicit contract theory as important relative to our 
baseline case. This is not surprising, given that price adjustment can be fairly frequent in this 
industry. At the other extreme, firms with sales to governments regard the explicit contract theory 
as important to their pricing practice. Typically, firms that set prices according to (one-day) 
information delays are more likely to identify with this theory.  
Implicit contracts, on the other hand, are more prominent in the industries other than 
commercial, personal, and business services; information, culture, and transportation; and 
manufacturing. Implicit contracts are also used less often between households and businesses than 
among other businesses, and are more important when firms have a more diverse consumer base. 
In addition, firms with information delays of more than one month are more likely to identify 
implicit contracts as being important to their own behaviour.  
  It should be noted that many firms recognize the importance of nominal contracts, 
customer relations, and cost-based pricing simultaneously.  Consistent with Amirault, Kwan, and 
Wilkinson (2006), we find that consumer relations and cost-related considerations can be more 
important factors in price rigidity.  
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Sticky information and menu costs 
Although sticky information and menu costs are among the least recognized theories, they provide 
significant explanation for sticky prices in our count data model. Our probit model results, 
therefore, reveal which firms are most likely to consider these theories as important to their 
businesses.  
For sticky information, firms that report that their price-setting information is delayed by 
one day or by more than a month are more likely to recognize the sticky-information theory. Firms 
that recognize this theory are likely to be in construction; manufacturing; and commercial, 
personal, and business services. These firms primarily sell to households outside their own region.  
They are state-dependent price-setters, and utilize contracts more than the average firms. These 
firms also view explicit contracts and cost-based pricing as very important.  
  As noted in Table 8, firms recognize the menu costs theory if they have a high buyer 
concentration (>50 per cent) and significant information delays (more than a month). These firms 
are less likely to be contract sellers or time-dependent price-setters.  Contrary to common belief, 
the number of employees, which is often a proxy for firm size, is in fact not a defining factor for 
recognizing the menu costs theory. It appears that the combination of information delays, explicit 
contracts, and buyer concentration constitutes the micro foundations for firms to recognize the 
menu costs theory.  
 
Factor stability 
According to Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), the factor stability theory suggests that some 
firms operate in relatively benign environments, where prices do not need to adjust more often 
because factors that determine prices are relatively stable. As Table 8 shows, our results provide 
some insight into these firms. We find that firms in information, culture, and transportation, and 25  25 
firms that primarily sell directly to consumers, are more likely to consider factor stability as 
important to their business. Changes in domestic input prices or in competitors’ prices are not 
likely to be important to these firms. They face a price leader in their industry. These firms are 
more likely to recognize the factor stability theory if they face fewer information delays. When do 
these firms change prices? Our model suggests that they are more likely to be state-dependent 
price-setters – that is, an unexpected shock or event, rather than a periodical price review, would 
trigger a price change. Our model shows that firms are more likely to recognize the factor stability 
theory because they find it difficult to change prices in a relatively stable environment; these firms 
also recognize menu costs, non-price competition, and low-inflation theories.   
 
Customer relations 
Customer relations is one of the most important sticky-price theories for Canadian firms – 67 per 
cent of firms recognize this theory as important. Our results suggest that smaller firms in 
construction; commercial, personal, and business services; and information, culture, and 
transportation are more likely to recognize this theory. In addition, the firms that worry about 
customer relations are less likely to consider explicit contracts. The presence of industry price 
leaders increases the probability of a firm recognizing this theory. As suggested by the Goodman-
Kruskal correlations, the customer relations theory is not a mutually exclusive price-setting 
behaviour; our results suggest that firms that recognize this theory as important to their business 
also recognize low inflation, sticky information, and coordination failure on a price decline. As the 
above analysis illustrates, the micro foundations of this theory are that the types of industries the 
firms are in and the types of clients they serve require a high level of sensitivity to customer 
relations.  
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Non-price competition and low inflation   
The non-price competition and low-inflation theories are recognized by about one-third of 
Canadian firms. From our non-price competition model, we find that only construction (which is in 
our baseline case) is likely to to recognize non-price competition. This result differs from the 
findings of Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), who suggest that there is no interindustry 
variation in non-price competition.  What triggers a price change for these firms? Our results 
suggest that firms that respond to a price change initiated by their competitors and that use sales 
campaigns are more likely to recognize the non-price competition theory. Firms that recognize this 
theory also consider low inflation and cost-based pricing to be important. 
According to Table 8, firms that recognize the low-inflation theory are primarily those that 
sell to governments. They are less likely to sell across borders and less sensitive to the price 
changes of competitors. These firms are more likely to report that a low-inflation environment 
restricts their ability to change prices when they report that factor stability, customer relations, and 
non-price competition are important. 
 
6  Conclusions 
Using the 2002–03 Bank of Canada price-setting survey data, we explore the price-setting 
behaviour of Canadian firms.  In this research, we address the key question of which firm and 
market characteristics affect price-adjustment frequencies. We find that firms that are state-
dependent price-setters, firms in the trade sector, firms with larger variable costs and more direct 
competitors, and firms located in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec tend to adjust prices more 
frequently than other firms, all else being equal. In addition, when firms recognize the theories of 
coordination failure on a price increase, sticky information, menu costs, factor stability, and 
customer relations, they tend to adjust prices less frequently.  27  27 
We also investigate the key question of what kind of micro foundations cause firms to 
recognize some sticky-price theories but not others. We find that industry type, customer type 
(households, government, or businesses), product destination (domestic or export), information 
availability, and contract utilization constitute the micro foundations for recognizing most sticky-
price theories. Furthermore, we find that coordination failure, cost-based pricing, and customer 
relations are the sticky-price theories widely recognized by Canadian firms. Firms need to take 
note of the market structures of micro foundations when maximizing their interests. 
In this research, we have made several contributions to the sticky-price literature. First, 
contrary to the findings of Blinder et al. (1998) and Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), we 
find that the theories of sticky information and menu costs are both important sources of price 
rigidity, since they lower the price-adjustment frequency, albeit in only a small percentage of 
firms. Second, our findings support Blinder et al.’s (1998) conclusion that sticky-price theories are 
not mutually exclusive, and we conclude that customer relations and cost-based pricing are the 
most complementary sticky-price theories (as well as the most highly recognized). Third, the 
theories of customer relations, cost-based pricing, and coordination failure (on a price increase) are 
strongly supported by the Canadian data. Fourth, this research provides useful information on 
different groups of firms. For example, we find that larger firms are more concerned with 
coordination failure than with using cost-based pricing or paying attention to customer relations, 
and manufacturers recognize sticky-information theory more than any other theory, all else held 
constant. Fifth, state-dependent price-setting firms change prices much more frequently than time-
dependent price-setters. According to Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006), the former account 
for approximately 34 per cent of firms in the private, non-commodity-producing sectors of the 
Canadian economy (much higher than in the United States; see Klenow and Kryvtsov 2005). 28  28 
Overall, this research shows that firms adjust prices in ways that maximize their interests based on 
their firm and market characteristics or micro foundations. This highlights the importance of 
dividing firms into different groups, and of endogenizing price-setting behaviour in 
macroeconomic modelling.  
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Table 1: Comparison between the Bank of Canada Survey and Five Other Studies  
  United States  United Kingdom  Sweden  Japan  European Union  Canada 
Timing  April 1990–March 1992  Sept. 1995  March–May 2000  April–May  2000  Feb. 2003–Nov.  2004  July 2002–April 2003 
Sample size  200  654  626  630  10,583  170 
Representative by 
industry? 
Yes  No, mainly manufacturing 
firms (68%) 
No, manufacturing and 
service sectors only 
No, largely manufacturing 
firms 
No, mainly manufacturing. 
Also construction, trade, and 
services 
Yes 
Industry distribution  Manufacturing 35% 










Construction and Real  
Estate: 10%  
Trade: 13% 









All other services 49% 
Exclusions based on 
firm size? 
Firms with  
<$10 million in sales 
excluded 
Sample dominated by large 
firms 
Firms with fewer than 5 
employees excluded 
Firm size unknown  No  Firms with fewer than 20 
employees excluded 
Firm size distribution  $10 to $24.9 million 23% 
$25 to $49.9 million 14% 
$50 million or more 
64% 
< or = 100 employees 19% 
101 to 500 employees 39% 
500+ employees 42% 
5 to 19 employees 25% 
20 to 199 employees 30% 
200+ employees 45% 
Firm size unknown  1-49 employees 47% 
50-199 employees 29% 
>=200 employees 24% 
20 to 99 employees 32% 
100 to 499 employees 28% 
500+ employees 40% 
All regions surveyed?  16 states in U.S. Northeast  All regions  All regions  Only companies listed on the 
First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, excluding 
financial institutions, 
insurance, and general trading 
companies. 
Region unknown. 
9 countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, 
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Table 2: Price-Setting Survey Literature: Key Features and Most Recognized Theories  
  Blinder et al. (1998)  Hall et al. (2000)  Nakagawa et al. (2000)  Apel et al. (2001)  Amirault et al. (2006)  Fabiani et al. (2005) 
Country  United States  United Kingdom  Japan  Sweden  Canada  European  Union 
Number of price 
adjustments per year 
Median [Mode] 
1.4 [1]  2 [1]  1-2 [1-2]  1 [1]  4 [1]  1[1]  
State- vs. time- 
dependent 
Time: 60% (not tested)  Time: 79% (10% used 
mixed) (not tested) 
Not tested.  Time: 58.9% (under normal 
conditions) (not tested) 
Time: 67% Yes, time-
dependent price-setters adjust 
less often. 
 
Does firm size matter 
for price-change 
frequency? 
No  No, but firm size 
influences the number of 
price reviews. 
Not tested.  Yes  Yes  No 
Does industry or sector 
matter for price-change 
frequency? 
Yes, trade sector is more 
flexible. 
Yes, significant variation 
across industries. 
Yes, differences between 
service and manufacturing. 
Yes   Significant variation across 
industries. 
Yes  
Do long-term contracts 
matter for price-change 
frequency? 
No, contract length and 
explicit contracts don’t 
matter, but implicit 
contracts matter. 
No.  No, but suggests that most 
firms use long-term 
contracts. 
Not tested, but they suggest 
customer relations and 
contract theories matter. 
No, explicit contracts or 
percentage of sales under 
contracts, but customer 
relations theory matters. 
Not tested, but most firms 
have long-term agreements.  
Does competitive 
pressure matter for 
price-change frequency?  
No, but coordination 
failure explains price 
rigidity. 
Yes, the number of 
competitors matters. 
Not tested.  Not tested, but customer 
relations and factor stability 
are cited as reason for firms 
using time-dependent 
changes. 
Yes, the number of 
competitors matters. 
Yes, the level of competition 
suggested by the firm. 
What sticky-price 
theories matter? 
Implicit contracts and 
coordination failure 
theories. 
Not tested.  Not tested.  Not tested.  Customer relations, menu 




recognized theories of 
price stickiness 
(by % recognition) 
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Table 3: Price-Setting Survey Literature: Product/Service Based Surveys and Other Evidence 
  Small and Yates (1999)  Buckle and Carlson (2000)  Owen and Trzepacz (2002)   Bils and Klenow (2004)  Dhyne et al. (2004)  
Country  England  New Zealand  United States (New York)  United States  10 E.U. countries 
Timing  September 1995  1986Q3–1996Q1  August–December 1999  1995–1997  Varying by country; in total  between 
January 1988–January 2004  
Data source  Bank of England PSS; 
654 firms 
Micro-survey data; various 
firms 
Micro-data, grocery chain 
industry: 220 goods in eight 
different locations 
BLS CPI data 350 
categories 
50 similar products, and total CPI 
Main results  More competitive 
product markets 
increase the propensity 
to change prices in 
response to demand 
shocks; but market 
structure does not affect 
the responsiveness to 
cost shocks. High export 
intensity reduces 
responsiveness to cost 
shocks. Cost increases 
matter more than 
decreases. 
Menu costs and firm size 
matter (price duration 
decreases as firm size 
increases). Price duration is 
6.7 months from survey data 
(average frequency less than 
2). 
After controlling for chain-
specific effects, higher menu 
costs are associated with a 
slight decrease in the 
probability of a price change 
and the size of a price 
change. Firm strategy is more 
influential in determining the 
incidence and magnitude of 
price change. 
½ prices last less than 
4.3 months. More 
frequent than Taylor 
(1980) and Calvo (1983). 
Prices vary dramatically 
across categories. 
Mean duration is 10.6 months (much 
higher than the U.S.). The hazard 
function is decreasing. Mass points 
identified 1 and 12. Pricing points 
common (0.99, 1.99, etc). Price changes 







Table 4: Distribution of Firm Responses to Sticky-Price Theories 
First group of theories   Unimportant  
(set = 0) 
Slightly important  
(set =1) 
Fairly important   
(set =2) 
Very important  
(set =3) 
Sticky information  147  16  6  1 
Coordination failure (on price decline)  117  12  22  19 
Coordination failure (on price increase)  100  25  26  19 
Cost-based pricing  56  23  33  58 
Explicit contracts  94  16  13  47 
Implicit contracts  116  17  23  14 




   
Menu costs  134  26     
Factor stability  117  53     
Non-price competition  95  75     
Customer relations  76  94     
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Table 5: Count Data Models’ Estimated Results: Original Baseline Case 
    Unrestricted model  Restricted model  Marginal effect 
  Variable codes
a  Estimated coefficients  e^b 
% of variable cost (standardized)  VARCOST  0.887**  0.715**  2.0435 
Number of employees (standardized)  EMPLOY  -1.094**  -1.121***  0.3261 
Goods sector  GOODS  -0.605     
Trade sector  TRADE  1.205**  1.713***  5.5458 
Atlantic Region  ATLANTIC  -0.518     
Province of Quebec  QUEBEC  1.497***  1.502***  4.4912 
Province of Ontario  ONTARIO  1.378***  1.689***  5.4153 
Prairie Provinces  PRAIRIES  -0.379     
% of households sales (standardized)  HOUSESL  -0.830***  -0.743***  0.4758 
% of public sector sales (standardized)  GOVSL  0.128     
% sales to other domestic regions (standardized)  OTHSL  0.786***  0.827***  2.2873 
% of exported sales  (standardized)  EXPORT  0.255  0.323**  1.3817 
% of sales to the top five buyers: between 11%-25%  FIVEBUYER25  -1.222**  -1.111**  0.3291 
% of sales to the top five buyers: between 26%-50%  FIVEBUYER50  -1.391**  -1.139**  0.3202 
% of sales to the top five buyers: greater than 50%  FIVEBUYER51  -1.115**  -1.096**  0.3344 
Wage costs (recognized as important)  WAGEVI  -0.926**  -0.832**  0.4350 
Domestic inputs (recognized as important)  DOMINPTSVI  1.462***  1.294***  3.6470 
Fees and other costs (recognized as important)  TFOCVI  -0.460     
Competitor prices (recognized as important)  COMPETITORVI  0.376  0.574**  1.7758 
Exchange rates (recognized as important)  FXCHNGVI  0.245     
Changes in demand (recognized as important )  DEMNDCHNGVI  0.183     
Economic forecasts (recognized as important )  FORECASTSVI  -1.225     
Sales campaigns (recognized as important )  SLSCMPGNVI  -0.264     
Parent company directive (recognized as important)  PRNTCMPNYVI  -2.655***  -2.486***  0.0833 
Information delay: day  INFOLAGDAY  -0.046     
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK  -0.254     
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH  -1.120**  -1.002***  0.3672 
Information delay: more than a month  INFOLAGMOREMONTH  -0.567     
% of contracted sales (standardized)  CNTRCT  1.945**  1.602**  4.9609 
State-dependent price-setting indicator  STATE  1.625***  1.598***  4.9422 
Number of direct competitors (standardized)  COMPET  2.590**  3.507***  33.356 
Industry price leader indicator  PLI  0.595  0.556*  1.7436 
Price leadership indicator  PL  0.103     
Menu costs theory (recognized as important)  MENU  -1.666***  -1.723***  0.1786 
Factor stability theory (recognized as important)  VARY  -0.808**  -0.634**  0.5307 
Customer relations theory (recognized as important)  CSTRLTN  -0.405  -0.652**  0.5211 
Non-price competition theory (recognized as important)  NPC  0.144     
Low-inflation theory (recognized as important)  LOWCPI  -0.385     
Sticky-information theory (recognized as important)  STICKYINFOYES  -1.007*  -0.911**  0.4019 
Coordination failure on a price decline theory (recognized 
as very important) 
COFAILDECVI  0.393     
Coordination failure on a price increase theory (recognized 
as very important) 
CONFAILINCVI  -1.490***  -1.522***  0.2182 
Cost-based pricing theory 
(recognized as very important) 
CBPVI  -0.196     
Explicit contracts theory 
(recognized as very important) 
EXPLICITVI  0.516     
Implicit contracts (recognized as very important)  IMPLICITVI  0.037     
Baseline case  Constant  4.640***  4.510***   
Test for overdispersion  ln(alpha) constant  0.557***  0.608***   
Log-likelihood function  ll  -650.896  -655.749   
Pearson chi-squared test  chi2  248.133***  238.428***   
Akaike's information criterion  aic  1409.793  1381.497   
Likelihood-ratio test between the full model and final selected model: LR Chi2(19) = 9.7 
e^b = exp(b) = factor change in expected count for unit increase in X. 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1% 
Notes:  (a) Scale variables are standardized for the estimation [(variable_value – mean)/(standard deviation)]. 














Table 6: Scale Variable Summary Statistics (N=170)   
  Variable  Medium  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Number of employees  EMPLOY  270  2769  8073  6  55000 
% of variable cost  VARCOST  70%  63.0%  25.7%  0  98 
% sales to home region  HOMESL  60%  59.6%  35.4%  0  100 
% sales to other domestic regions  OTHSL  11.5%  21.2%  24.3%  0  100 
% of exported sales   EXPORT  0%  19.2%  30.1%  0  100 
% of households sales  HOUSESL  0%  31.4%  41.7%  0  100 
% of business sales  BUSSL  82.5%  60.7%  41.3%  0  100 
% of public sector sales  GOVSL  0%  8.0%  19.1%  0  100 
% of contracted sales  CNTRCT  62.5%  52.1%  44.9%  0  100 
Number of competitors  COMPET  6  33  119  0  1000 
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Models: Estimation Results 
Variable description  Variable codes    Coordination 
failure  
(on price decline) 
(COFAILDEC) 
Coordination 












     Estimated coefficients 
Cost structure (standardized)  VARCOST        0.317***     -0.285** 
Number of employees 
(standardized) 
EMPLOY  0.252*  0.319***  -0.579***       
Industry type: construction   CONST  -1.500***  -1.217**          
Industry type: manufacturing  MANUF  -1.142***        -0.575 
Industry type: retail and 
wholesale trade  
RWTRADE  -0.701*  -0.915**     -0.765*    
Industry type: commercial, 
personal, business services 
CPBS  -1.143***  -0.535*        -0.909*** 
Industry type: information, 
culture, and transportation 
INFOCULTTRANS  -1.179***  -0.605*  0.712**     -1.327*** 
Atlantic Region  ATLANTIC           
Province of Quebec   QUEBEC       1.197***     
Province of Ontario   ONTARIO            
Prairie Provinces  PRAIRIES  0.617**  0.472*          
% of households sales 
(standardized) 
HOUSESL  -0.494***           -0.428** 
% of public sector sales 
(standardized) 
GOVSL     -0.212*  0.278***  0.215**    
% sales to other domestic 
regions (standardized) 
OTHSL  -0.236*         
% of exported sales 
(standardized) 
EXPORT  -0.262*  -0.321**        0.215 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 11%-25% 
FIVEBUYER25     0.655**     0.497*  -1.063*** 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 26%-50% 
FIVEBUYER50          -0.805* 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: greater than 50% 
FIVEBUYER51    0.43  0.647***    -0.623 
Wage changes  WAGEVI      0.937***     
Domestic input cost changes  DOMINPTSVI  0.365    0.702***     
Changes in taxes, fees, or 
other costs 
TFOCVI          -0.697* 
Competitor's price change  COMPETITORVI  0.464**  0.748***          
Foreign exchange rate 
changes 
FXCHNGVI     0.797***  0.516**  0.780**    
Demand changes  DEMNDCHNGVI    -0.398       
Economic forecast changes  FORECASTSVI          0.728* 
Sales campaigns  SLSCMPGNVI           
Parent company 
incentives/directives 
PRNTCMPNYVI  1.320**           1.202** 
Information delay: day  INFOLAGDAY     1.042***  -0.55  1.363***    
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK           
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH  0.922***         
              (continued)  
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Table 7 (concluded)           
Variable description  Variable codes    Coordination 
failure  
(on price decline) 
(COFAILDEC) 
Coordination 












     Estimated coefficients 
Information delay: more than 
a month 
INFOLAGMOREMONTH 
  0.759**      1.021*** 
% of contracted sales   CNTRCT  
      1.175***  -0.321** 
State-dependent price-setting  STATE      -0.464**     
Number of direct competitors 
(standardized) 
COMPET      -0.169*     
Industry price leader indicator  PLI  0.463*           0.590** 
Price leadership indicator  PL  -1.147***  -0.676***  0.587***       
Menu costs  MENU  0.415      0.509*  0.423 
Factor stability  VARY      0.369*     
Customer relations  CSTRLTN  0.815***  0.580**     0.580**  0.791*** 
Non-price competition  NPC     -0.534**        -0.406* 
Low inflation  LOWCPI    0.491**  -0.345     
Sticky information  STICKYINFOYES      0.668**     
Coordination failure (price 
increase) 
COFAILINCVI        0.672**     0.575* 
Coordination failure (price 
decline) 
COFAILDECVI           
Cost-based pricing  CBPVI  0.615**  0.617***     0.552**  0.743*** 
Explicit contracts  EXPLICITVI     -0.805***        0.483* 
Implicit contracts  IMPLICITVI    1.186***       
              
Cut point between 
unimportant and slightly 
important 
_cut 1  1.095***  0.867***  0.623***  1.158***  0.983*** 
Cut point between slightly 
important and fairly important 
_cut 2  1.376***  1.427***  1.184***  1.620***  1.402*** 
Cut point between fairly 
important and very important 
_cut 3  2.074***  2.284***  1.920***  1.974***  2.237*** 
Log-likelihood function  ll  -131.165  -151.434  -171.361  -128.854  -129.038 
Chi-squared test  chi2  61.961***  80.015***  106.597***  116.999***  70.807*** 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1%  
Note: (a) Scale variables are standardized.  (b) No asterisk indicates significant at 15% and the model is sensitive to its removal. 
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Table 8: Probit Models: Estimation Results (N=170) 
Variable description  Variable codes
a  Sticky information 
(SITICKINFOYES) 













    Estimated coefficients 
Number of employees 
(standardized) 
EMPLOY        -0.365**     
Industry type: construction   CONST  1.640**      0.978**     
Industry type: manufacturing  MANUF  1.474**        -0.941***   
Industry type: retail and 
wholesale trade  
RWTRADE          -0.860**   
Industry type: commercial, 
personal, business services 
CPBS  1.374**      0.881***  -0.624**   
Industry type: information, 
culture, and transportation 
INFOCULTTRANS      0.736*  0.857**  -0.846**   
Atlantic Region  ATLANTIC  1.448**           
Province of Quebec   QUEBEC  -0.861    -0.975***  -0.727**     
Province of Ontario   ONTARIO        0.519*     
Prairie Provinces  PRAIRIES  -1.002*           
% of sales to households 
(standardized) 
HOUSESL  0.657**    0.381***       
% of sales to public sector 
(standardized) 
GOVSL        -0.212    0.243** 
% sales to other domestic 
regions (standardized)  
OTHSL  0.440**      0.216  0.190*   
% of exported sales 
(standardized) 
EXPORT  0.43      0.281**    -0.310** 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: greater than 50% 
FIVEBUYER51    0.857***         
Wage changes  WAGEVI  -0.931*           
Domestic input cost changes  DOMINPTSVI      -0.941***       
Competitor's price change  COMPETITORVI      -0.728**    0.521**   
Foreign exchange rate changes  FXCHNGVI  -1.840**           
Demand changes  DEMNDCHNGVI  -1.023*           
Sales campaigns  SLSCMPGNVI  `          0.720**   
Information delay: day  INFOLAGDAY  1.432**  -1.216*    -0.757*     
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK      -0.977**       
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH      -1.144***       
Information delay: more than a 
month 
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Table 8 (concluded)             
Variable description  Variable codes
a  Sticky information 
(SITICKINFOYES) 













    Estimated coefficients 
Percentage of c ontracted  sales 
(standardized)  
CNTRCT    -0.600***    -0.516***     
State-dependent price-setting  STATE  0.876*  -0.547*  0.502*       
Number of direct competitors 
(standardized) 
COMPET  0.424***          -2.691*** 
Industry price leader indicator  PLI    0.540**  -0.722**  0.731***     
Price leadership indicator  PL      0.870**       
Menu costs  MENU      0.599*       
Factor stability  VARY    0.648**        0.512** 
Customer relations  CSTRLTN          0.364  1.040*** 
Non-price competition  NPC      0.500*      0.494** 
Low inflation  LOWCPI      0.619**  1.040***  0.603***   
Sticky information  STICKYINFOYES        0.6    -0.696* 
Coordination failure (price 
decrease) 
COFAILDECVI  0.951    0.758*  1.390***     
Coordination failure (price 
increase) 
COFAILINC          -0.731**   
Cost-based pricing  CBPVI  1.196***  -0.432  0.455*    0.470**   
Explicit contracts  EXPLICITVI  1.103**  0.822**    0.503  -0.421*   
Implicit contracts  IMPLICITVI             
Constant  Constant  -3.534***  -1.644***  -0.247  -1.235***  -0.28  -1.810*** 
Log-likelihood function  ll  -35.987  -70.03  -71.868  -78.273  -99.799  -81.943 
Chi-squared test  chi2  62.777  35.477  67.236  77.214  33.713  52.988 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1% 
Note: (a) The following were insignificant in all six models: VARCOST, FIVEBUYER25, FIVEBUYER50, TFOCVI, FORECASTVI, PARENTCOMPANYVI.
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Appendix A: The Survey Methodology 
 
The Bank of Canada’s price-setting survey was conduced from 2002–03 via structured interviews with 
the senior management of 170 firms across Canada. The firms selected for the survey had to be able to 
set their prices autonomously in response to market conditions. Thus, the sample was selected to be 
representative of the private, for-profit, unregulated, and non-commodity-producing segment of the 
Canadian economy in terms of industry sector, firm size, and, to some extent, regional distribution (see 
Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006). Drawing upon the experience of the Bank’s regional offices in 
conducting firm-based surveys, a non-random form of sampling, widely employed in business surveys 
and known as “quota sampling,”
14 was used to generate a representative sample of firms (Amirault, 
Kwan, and Wilkinson 2006).  
  The quota sample has many advantages and disadvantages compared with a random probability 
sample. The benefits of using a quota sampling technique are as follows: (i) a higher response rate, (ii) 
the sample is ‘representative’ a priori and weighting for under-represented groups is not necessary, (iii) 
small firms can be represented easily (and therefore are not a source of bias), (iv) the turnaround time 
for quota samples is generally shorter, and (v) perhaps most importantly, the quota sampling method is 
most cost effective in face-to-face interviews.
15 Because firms were interviewed by the Bank in all ten 
provinces, the ability to select a firm based on their location within a region, as well as industry and 
firm size, was very important in minimizing the resources used to conduct the survey. If firms were 
selected randomly, the selection could have been done in relatively isolated areas, which would have 
greatly increased the difficulty in conducting face-to-face interviews. 
                                                   
14 See Martin and Papile (2004) for a description of the Bank of Canada’s regional offices’ survey experience. The non-
random sampling used in the regional offices and in the price survey is called “quota sampling” because, for a given 
subgroup in a target universe, a “quota” of respondents is selected that, when aggregated, is intended to produce a 
representative sample of the target universe. Thus, in instances where an initial company contact chooses not to participate 
in the survey, another firm with comparable industry or firm-size characteristics is selected from commercial business 
directories, to achieve sample targets. 
15 Blinder et al. (1998) note that personal interviews conducted by knowledgeable economics professionals can improve the 
quality of the survey results. Our experience with missing responses and errors in completed surveys returned by fax 
suggests that Blinder et al.’s preference for personal interviews is well founded. 
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Although the quota sampling method has advantages, it inherently has potential biases limiting 
the degree to which statistical inference can be made in our analysis (Lohr 1999). The sources of 
potential bias are: (i) familiar firms are more likely to be selected (selection bias), (ii) firms in more 
convenient locations are more likely to be selected (location bias), and (iii) the non-response rate may 
be non-random (non-random non-response rate bias).  
The potential selection bias is minimized in the Bank’s survey, and hence it is less likely to be a 
large source of bias. In this survey, firms were selected from a list that was generated from large in-
house databases, which include all firms that are familiar or unfamiliar with the Bank. In several cases, 
firms selected had no previous contact with the surveyors.  
The potential location bias is restricted by the fact that firms selected must meet the industry 
and size stratum requirements. These do have some impact on the prior preference for locations of 
firms. The Bank is fully aware of this kind of bias and makes every effort to minimize it. 
The potential bias caused by the non-randomness of the non-response rate is more prominent 
among the three sources of potential bias. As with the first two sources of bias, the magnitude of the 






Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Descriptions 
 
Table B1: Master List of All Variables  
Variable group  Variable name  Variable description  Categorical 
Cost structure  VARCOST  % of the firm’s total cost that is variable   
Firm size  EMPLOY  number of employees   
Industry  INDUSTRY  industry: set =1 if construction, =2 if manufacturing, =3 if retail or 
wholesale trade, =4 if information, culture, or transportation, =5 if 
finance, insurance, or real estate, and =6 if commercial, personal, or 
business services 
Yes 
HOUSESL  consumers type: % of sales to households   
BU.S.SL  consumers type: % of sales to businesses   
Consumer type: % of sales 
GOVSL  consumers type: % of sales to governments   
HOMESL  product destination: % of sales to home region   
OTHSL  product destination: % of sales to domestic consumers outside of the 
home region 
 
DOMESTIC  product destination: = 100% of sales sold domestically   
Product destination: % of sales 
EXPORTS  product destination: % of sales to other countries   
Top five buyers: % of sales  FIVEBUYER  consumers power: set =1 if the top five buyers represent 0-10% of 
sales, =2 if 11-25, =3 if 26-50, and =4 if 51-100 
Yes 
PLI  price leadership dummy variable: there is a price leader in the 
industry 
Yes  Price leadership 
PL  price leadership dummy variable: the firms believe themselves to be 
the price leader 
Yes 
REGUALR  price-adjustment trigger: “we routinely change prices at regular 
intervals,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance  
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
WAGE  price-adjustment trigger: “when wages change, so does our price,” 
taking a value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) to very 
important (3)] 
Yes 
DOMESTINPUTS  price-adjustment trigger: “when domestic inputs change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) 
to very important (3)] 
Yes 
TFOC  price-adjustment trigger: “when taxes, fees, or other charges change, 
so do prices,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
COMPETITORS  price-adjustment trigger: “when price changes by competitors, so 
does our price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
FXCHANGES  price-adjustment trigger: “when exchange rates change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) 
to very important (3)] 
Yes 
DEMANDCHANGES  price-adjustment trigger: “when demand changes, so does our price,” 
taking a value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) to very 
important (3)] 
Yes 
FORECASTS  price-adjustment trigger: “when economic/inflation forecasts change, 
so does our price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
SALESCAMPAIGNS  price-adjustment trigger: “when sales campaigns change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) 
to very important (3)] 
Yes 
Pricing triggers/motivations to 
adjust transaction price 
PARENTCOMANY  price-adjustment trigger: “when directives from parent company 
change, so does our price,” taking a value 0-3 given level of 
importance [unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
Contract sales  CNTRCT  contract sales:  
% of sales under contracts 
 
Competitive forces   COMPET  competitive forces: number of direct competitors   
State-dependent pricing  STATE  price reviews: reviews prices spontaneously or in response to specific 
events 
Yes 
STICKINFO  sticky-price theory: sticky-information theory: “the information used 
to review (and ultimately change) prices is available infrequently. 
Therefore, prices may be slow to adjust to new conditions,” taking a 
value 0-3 given level of importance [unimportant (0) to very 
important (3)] 
Yes  First group of sticky-price-setting 
theories 
 
COFAILDEC  sticky-price theory: coordination failure on a price cut, “firms delay 
price cuts because they don't want to be the first in the industry to cut 
prices,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
 [unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
    (continued)   
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Table B1 (concluded)       
Variable group  Variable name  Variable description  Categorical 
COFAILINC  sticky-price theory: coordination failure on a price increase: “firms 
delay raising prices because they don't want to be the first in the 
industry to raise prices,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
CBP  sticky-price theory: cost-based pricing: “prices depend mainly on the 
costs of labour and raw materials used in producing goods and 
services. Therefore, prices don't change until costs change,” taking a 
value 0-3 given level of importance 
[unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
EXPLICIT  sticky-price theory: explicit contracts: “firms would like to adjust 
prices more often to reflect market conditions, but fixed-price 
contracts make it difficult to pass on a price increase when a contract 
is active,” taking a value 0-3 given level of importance 
  [unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
First group of sticky-price-setting 
theories  
IMPLICIT  sticky-price theory: implicit contracts: “firms delay price increases 
because they have an implied understanding with customers that they 
will not raise prices in tight markets,” taking a value 0-3 given level 
of importance [unimportant (0) to very important (3)] 
Yes 
MENU  sticky-price theory: menu costs: “it would be too costly to change 
prices more often (time, effort, out-of-pocket costs),” taking a value 
0 or 1 given level of importance [unimportant (0) or important (1)] 
Yes 
VARY  sticky-price theory: factor stability: “factors influencing prices do not 
change often enough to warrant changes,” taking a value 0 or 1 given 
level of importance [unimportant (0) or important (1)] 
Yes 
CSTRLTN  sticky-price theory: customer relations: “prices could not change 
more often without disturbing customer relations,” taking a value 0 
or 1 given level of importance [unimportant (0) or important (1)] 
Yes 
NPC  sticky-price theory: non-price competition: “we are more likely to 
amend product characteristics (e.g., warranty, delivery lag) than 
prices,” taking a value 0 or 1 given level of importance  
[unimportant (0) or important (1)] 
Yes 
Second group of sticky-price-
setting theories 
LOWCPI  sticky-price theory: low inflation: “low inflation makes large price 
changes more noticeable,” taking a value 0 or 1 given level of 
importance [unimportant (0) or important (1)] 
Yes 
Frequency of price adjustment  PRICECHANGE  price-adjustment frequency: the number of times a firm actually 









Table B2: Derived Categorical Explanatory Variables  
Variable group  Variable name  Variable description 
MANUF  industry dummy: manufacturing 
CONST  industry dummy: construction 
RWTRADE  industry dummy: retail and wholesale trade 
CBPS  industry dummy: commercial, business, and personal services 
FIRE  industry dummy: finance, insurance, and real estate 
INFOCULTTRANS  industry dummy: information, culture, and transportation 
GOODS  industry sector dummy: manufacturing and construction  
SERVICE  industry sector dummy: information, culture, and transportation; 




TRADE  industry sector dummy: wholesale and retail trade 
FIVEBUYER10  customer power: the top five buyers represent 0-10% of sales 
FIVEBUYER25  customer power: the top five buyers represent 11-25% of sales 
FIVEBUYER50  customer power: the top five buyers represent 26-50% of sales 
Top five buyers: 
% of sales 
FIVEBUYER51  customer power: the top five buyers represent more than 50%  
of sales 
INFOLAGDAY  price-setting information lag:  
one day 
INFOLAGWEEK  price-setting information lag:  
less than one week 
INFOLAGMONTH  price-setting information lag: 
less than one month 
Price-setting information 
delay 
INFOLAGMOREMONTH  price-setting information lag:  
more than one month 
ATLANTIC  regional dummies: =1, the firm is located in Atlantic Canada,  
if not =0. 
ONTARIO  regional dummies: =1, the firm is located in Ontario, if not =0. 
QUEBEC  regional dummies: =1, the firm is located in Quebec, if not =0. 
PRAIRIES  regional dummies: =1, the firm is located in Prairies, if not =0. 
Canadian regions 
BC  regional dummies: =1, the firm is located in British Columbia,  
if not =0. 
STICKINFOYES  sticky-price theory: sticky-information theory: “the information used 
to review (and ultimately change) prices is available infrequently; 
therefore, prices may be slow to adjust to new conditions,” taking a 
value 1 if the firm said “important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
COFAILDECVI  sticky-price theory: coordination failure on a price cut, “firms delay 
price cuts because they don't want to be the first in the industry to cut 
prices,” taking a value 1 if the firm said “very important,” otherwise 
set equal to 0. 
COFAILINCVI  sticky-price theory: coordination failure on a price increase: “firms 
delay raising prices because they don't want to be the first in the 
industry to raise prices,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this theory 
is “very important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
CBPVI  sticky-price theory: cost-based pricing: “prices depend mainly on the 
costs of labour and raw materials used in producing goods and 
services; therefore, prices don't change until costs change,” taking a 
value 1 if the firm said this theory is “very important,” otherwise set 
equal to 0. 
EXPLICITVI  sticky-price theory: explicit contracts: “firms would like to adjust 
prices more often to reflect market conditions, but fixed-price 
contracts make it difficult to pass on price increases when a contract 
is active,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this theory is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
First group of sticky-price-
setting theories 
IMPLICITVI  sticky-price theory: implicit contracts: “firms delay price increases 
because they have an implied understanding with customers that they 
will not raise prices in tight markets,” taking a value 1 if the firm said 
this theory is “very important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
REGULARVI  price-adjustment trigger: “we routinely change prices at regular 
intervals,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this theory is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
WAGEVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when wages change, so does our price,” 
taking a value 1 if the firm said this theory is “very important,” 
otherwise set equal to 0. 
DOMESTINPUTSVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when domestic inputs change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
Pricing triggers/ 
motivations to adjust 
transaction price 
 





Table B2 (concluded) 
Variable group  Variable name  Variable description 
TFOCVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when taxes, fees, or other charges change, 
so do prices,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is 
“very important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
COMPETITORSVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when price changes by competitors, so 
does our price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is 
“very important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
FXCHANGESVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when exchange rates change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
DEMANDCHANGESVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when demand changes, so does our price,” 
taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
FORECASTSVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when economic/inflation forecasts change, 
so does our price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing 
trigger is “very important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
SALESCAMPAIGNSVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when sales campaigns change, so does our 
price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this pricing trigger is “very 
important,” otherwise set equal to 0. 
Pricing triggers/ 
motivations to adjust 
transaction price  
 
PARENTCOMANYVI  price-adjustment trigger: “when directives from parent company 
change, so does our price,” taking a value 1 if the firm said this 





Appendix C: Count Model Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Baseline Case 
In Table C1, we report the results of the same negative binominal regression model that appears in 
section 4.2.1 with an alternative baseline case. We undertake this analysis to examine the robustness of 
the model. Our categorical variables remain the same in this alternative baseline case, but we use the 
raw scale variables, rather than their standardized counterparts. By doing so, this alternative baseline 
case becomes a small firm (six employees) in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry located in 
British Columbia. This firm sells to business in its home region, does not use any contracts, and has no 
direct competitors. As in the original baseline case, this firm also has no information delays and is a 
time-dependent price adjustor. It sells less than 10 per cent of its sales to its top five buyers, and 
believes that neither sticky-price theory nor a pricing trigger (except the variable REGULAR) is very 
important.   
  When we adopt this alternative baseline case, we find that the magnitude of the marginal effects 
for each of the scale variables (Table 6) is significantly higher, and the constant term (our estimate for 
our baseline case) is insignificantly different from zero. In essence, moving from the original baseline 
case to the alternative one reveals marginal effects from the perspective of a low-frequency price 
adjustor, rather than from that of a high-frequency price adjustor. Note that the sign and level of 
significance of the parameter estimates in the restricted model of the alternative baseline case are 
identical to those of the original baseline case. The maximized values of the two log-likelihood 
functions are also identical. The major difference between these two models, as shown in column 5 of 
Table 5 and Table C1, is that in the restricted model of the alternative baseline case, a unit change in a 
firm’s variable cost, sales outside of its home region, sales to household, and contracted sales leads to a 
smaller/greater amount of price-adjustment frequency, depending on the negative/positive sign of the 
beta coefficient estimate. The coefficient estimates associated with other categorical variables have 
remained unchanged. This indicates that the two baseline cases are both acceptable, depending on 
which will make the interpretation straightforward.  
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Table C1 : Count Data Model Results: Alternative Baseline Case 
    Unrestricted model  Restricted model  Marginal effect 
Variable description  Variable codes  Estimated coefficients  e^b 
% of variable cost   VARCOST   0.035**  0.028**  1.028 
Number of employees   EMPLOY  -0.00014***  -0.00014***  1.000 
Goods sector  GOODS  -0.605     
Trade sector  TRADE  1.205**  1.713***  5.546 
Atlantic Canada  ATLANTIC  -0.518     
Province of Quebec   QUEBEC   1.497***  1.502***  4.491 
Province of Ontario   ONTARIO   1.378***  1.689***  5.414 
Prairie Provinces   PRAIRIES  -0.379     
% of households sales  HOUSESL   -0.020***  -0.018***  0.982 
% of public sector sales   GOVSL   0.007     
% sales to other domestic regions   OTHSL   0.032***  0.034***  1.035 
% of exported sales    EXPORT  0.008  0.011**  1.011 
% of sales to the top five buyers: between 11%-25%  FIVEBUYER25  -1.222**  -1.111**  0.329 
% of sales to the top five buyers: between 26%-50%  FIVEBUYER50  -1.391**  -1.139**  0.320 
% of sales to the top five buyers: greater than 50%  FIVEBUYER51  -1.115**  -1.096**  0.334 
Wage costs (recognized as important)  WAGEVI  -0.926**  -0.832**  0.435 
Domestic inputs (recognized as important)  DOMINPTSVI  1.462***  1.294***  3.647 
Fees and other costs (recognized as important)  TFOCVI  -0.46     
Competitor prices (recognized as important)  COMPETITORVI  0.376  0.574*  1.775 
Exchange rates (recognized as important)  FXCHNGVI  0.245     
Changes in demand (recognized as important)  DEMNDCHNGVI  0.183     
Economic forecasts (recognized as important)  FORECASTSVI  -1.225     
Sales campaigns (recognized as important)  SLSCMPGNVI  -0.264     
Parent company directive (recognized as important)  PRNTCMPNYVI  -2.655***  -2.486  0.083 
Information delay: day  INFOLAGDAY  -0.046     
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK  -0.254     
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH  -1.120**  -1.002**  0.367 
Information delay: more than a month  INFOLAGMOREMONTH  -0.567     
% of contracted sales   CNTRCT   0.043**  0.036**  1.037 
State-dependent price-setting indicator  STATE  1.625***  1.598***  4.943 
Number of direct competitors   COMPET   0.022**  0.029***  1.029 
Industry price leader indicator  PLI  0.595  0.556*  1.744 
Price leadership indicator  PL  0.103     
Menu costs theory (recognized as important)  MENU  -1.666***  -1.723***  0.179 
Factor stability theory (recognized as important)  VARY  -0.808**  -0.634**  0.530 
Customer relations theory (recognized as important)  CSTRLTN  -0.405  -0.652**  0.521 
Non-price competition theory (recognized as important)  NPC  0.144     
Low-inflation theory (recognized as important)  LOWCPI  -0.385     
Sticky-information theory (recognized as important)  STICKYINFOYES  -1.007*  -0.911**  0.402 
Coordination failure on a price decline theory (recognized 
as very important) 
COFAILDECVI  0.393     
Coordination failure on price increase theory (recognized 
as very important) 
CONFAILINCVI  -1.490***  -1.522***  0.218 
Cost-based pricing theory (recognized as very important)  CBPVI  -0.196     
Explicit contracts theory (recognized as very important)  EXPLICITVI  0.516     
Implicit contracts (recognized as very important)  IMPLICITVI  0.037     
Baseline case  Constant  -0.409  -0.055   
Test for overdispersion  lnalpha  0.557***  0.608***   
Log-likelihood function  ll  -650.896  -655.749   
Pearson chi-squared test  chi2  248.133  238.428   
Akaike's information criterion  aic  1409.793  1381.497   
Likelihood-ratio test between the full model and final selected model: LR chi2(19) = 9.7 
e^b = exp(b) = factor change in expected count for unit increase in x. See equation (6b). 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1% 
Notes:  (a) Scale variables are standardized for the estimation [(variable_value – mean)/(standard deviation)]. 










Appendix D: Alternative Ordered Probit and Probit Estimations 
 
In section 5.2.1, we argue that if one wishes to closely identify the relationship between the ranking of 
a specific theory and its observable characteristics, it is important to control for the rankings of other 
theories. This view is largely driven by the fact that, because a firm’s price-setting behaviour is a 
function of firm- and market-specific characteristics, and because price-setting theories are not 
mutually exclusive (as shown in section 5.1), we should control for the presence of other theories if we 
wish to isolate the above-mentioned relationship. In section 5.2.1, we have done this by including the 
“very important” response for the first group of theories and the “important” response for the second 
group. Admittedly, this approach has both advantages and disadvantages.  
The advantage of this approach is that we should be better able to isolate recognition of one 
theory from another, and thus identify a closer relationship between the firms’ characteristics and 
theory rankings. In addition, this approach should avoid the possibility of omitting relevant explanatory 
variables that would lead to bias. This approach is consistent with Blinder et al. (1998), who provide a 
more appropriate basis for comparison. 
  There are two potential disadvantages to this approach. First, there is the question of whether there 
is an endogeneity problem by including these controls, which may lead to another kind of bias. Second, 
if a macroeconomist wanted to use our results to determine whether a firm would find a specific theory 
important, it is unlikely that they would also know the firm’s ranking of other theories and would 
therefore not be able to condition their selection as we have done.  
To respond to these concerns, we present the results of an alternative set of ordered probit 
models in Table D1, and probit models in Table D2. These models have been estimated in the same 
way as those presented in section 5.2.1, except that we have excluded the ranking of other theories in 
the regressions. We have a number of observations regarding these results.    
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First, in comparison with the regression results reported in Tables 7 and 8, we find that ten of 
the eleven alternative models have the same or lower pseudo R-squared and, more importantly, we 
identify, on average, fewer statistically significant firm and market characteristics. In particular, we 
find that fewer industry-type variables are identifiable without controlling for other theory responses. 
This result is not surprising, given the theory response correlations and their statistical significance in 
the results presented in Tables 7 and 8.  
The one model that does better without controlling for other theory rankings is the menu costs 
theory. We find that, once we remove the three significant theory variables, three more firm 
characteristic variables become statistically significant in the model. However, only 21 of the 170 firms 
said that menu costs were important. This conclusion is drawn from a smaller number of observations.  
In general, we find that there are a number of similarities between the two sets of results. We 
find that many explanatory variables remain significant in both models, and the sign and magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients are very similar. Overall, however, we conclude that, by including the “very 
important” and “important” responses to other theories in our model, our results are more consistent 
with those of the Goodman-Kruskal tests and we are better able to explain the data.  
In response to the second criticism of this approach, we have three observations. First, 
economists do not observe all the information provided in this data set. Therefore, the fact that we 
control for other responses is not inconsistent with our overall approach. Second, by controlling for 
other theory responses, we can link more firm and market characteristics with the theory of interest, 
which is perhaps more important than the perceived conditioning problem, and we avoid potential 
omitted variable bias. Third, given that the result is conditional on a cross-sectional sample, we have no 
instruments with which to evaluate the potential problem of endogeneity caused by including other 
theory responses.  
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Table D1: Ordered Probit Models: Estimation Results 
Variable description  Variable codes

















     Estimated coefficients 
Cost structure (standardized)  VARCOST 
-0.448***    0.347***     
Number of employees 
(standardized) 
EMPLOY 
  0.185*  -0.575***  -0.387**   
Industry type: construction   CONST 
-0.902*         
Industry type: manufacturing  MANUF 
-1.203***         
Industry type: retail and 
wholesale trade  
RWTRADE 
  -0.561*    -0.791**   
Industry type: commercial, 
personal, and business 
services 
CPBS 
-1.278***         
Industry type: information, 
culture, and transportation 
INFOCULTTRANS 
-0.929**    0.758**    -0.686* 
Atlantic Region  ATLANTIC 
         
Province of Quebec   QUEBEC  
0.674**    1.009***     
Province of Ontario   ONTARIO  
         
Prairie Provinces  PRAIRIES 
0.733**  0.625**       
% of households sales 
(standardized) 
HOUSESL 
-0.485***  -0.182*      -0.283** 
% of public sector  sales 
(standardized) 
GOVSL 
  -0.193*  0.325***  0.179*   
% sales to other domestic 
regions (standardized) 
OTHSL 
  0.192**       
% of exported sales 
(standardized) 
EXPORT 
         
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 11%-25% 
FIVEBUYER25 
      0.465*  -0.672** 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 26%-50% 
FIVEBUYER50 
  -0.609**      -0.613* 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: greater than 50% 
FIVEBUYER51 
    0.668***     
Wage changes  WAGEVI 
0.661**    0.811***     
Domestic input cost changes  DOMINPTSVI 
0.399*    0.515***     
Changes in taxes, fees, or 
other costs 
TFOCVI 
        -0.585 
Competitor's price change  COMPETITORVI 
0.455*  0.582***       
Foreign exchange rate 
changes 
FXCHNGVI 
  0.854***    0.670**  0.586** 
Demand changes  DEMNDCHNGVI 
  -0.425*  -0.438**     
Economic forecast changes  FORECASTSVI 
  -0.809       
Sales campaigns  SLSCMPGNVI 




1.702***         
Information delay:  day  INFOLAGDAY 
  0.52    1.014***   
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK 
         
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH 
1.110***         
Information delay: more than 
a month 
INFOLAGMOREMONTH 
  0.581*     
1.059*** 
   
          (continued)  
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Table D1 (concluded) 

















     Estimated coefficients 
% of contracted sales   CNTRCT  
1.681**  -0.317***  0.963*  0.979***  -0.243** 
State-dependent price-setting  STATE 
    -0.428**     
Number of direct competitors 
(standardized) 
COMPET 
2.409***         
Industry price leader indicator  PLI 
-0.594*    0.534**    0.616*** 
Price leadership indicator  PL 
0.375         
    
         
Cut point between 
unimportant and slightly 
important 
_cut 1 
1.119  0.582***  0.22  0.474***  0.598*** 
Cut point between slightly 
important and fairly important 
_cut 2 
1.432**  1.078***  0.759***  0.900***  0.948*** 
Cut point between fairly 
important and very important 
_cut 3 
2.163***  1.789***  1.460***  1.233***  1.660*** 
Log-likelihood function  ll 
-126.567  -167.923  -178  -134.5  -147.766 
Chi-squared test  chi2 
71.156  47.039  93.318  105.707  33.351 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1% 
Notes:  (a) Scale variables are standardized for the estimation [(variable_value – mean)/(standard deviation)]. 






Table D2: Probit Models: Estimation Results (N=170) 
  Variable codes
a  Sticky information 
(SITICKINFOYES) 














    Estimated coefficients 
Number of employees 
(standardized) 
EMPLOY 
      -0.308**     
Industry type: construction   CONST 
      0.869**     
Industry type: manufacturing  MANUF 
1.098***        -0.389*   
Industry type: commercial, 
personal, business services 
CPBS 
           
Industry type: information, 
culture, and transportation 
INFOCULTTRANS 
      0.561*     
Atlantic Region  ATLANTIC 
  0.598*  0.668**  0.970***     
Province of Quebec   QUEBEC 
1.084**      0.553     
Province of Ontario   ONTARIO 
    -0.633**       
Prairie Provinces  PRAIRIES 
      0.772***     
% of sales to households 
(standardized) 
HOUSESL 
      0.672**    0.524* 
% of sales to public sector 
(standardized) 
GOVSL 
0.346*  0.417**  0.303**       
% sales to other domestic 
regions (standardized)  
OTHSL 
           
% of exported sales 
(standardized) 
EXPORT 
0.238  0.174    0.260**  0.167*   
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 11%-25% 
FIVEBUYER25 
      0.177    -0.277** 
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: between 26%-50% 
FIVEBUYER50 
  0.652*         
% of sales to the top five 
buyers: greater than 50% 
FIVEBUYER51 
           
Domestic input cost changes  DOMINPTSVI 
  1.305***         
Changes in taxes, fees, or other 
costs 
TFOCVI 
           
Competitor's price change  COMPETITORVI 
    -0.799***       
Foreign exchange rate changes  FXCHNGVI 
-1.291*           
Demand changes  DEMNDCHNGVI 
    -0.469*    0.340*   
Economic forecast changes  FORECASTSVI 
-1.280**           
Sales campaigns  SLSCMPGNVI 
-0.930**      -0.353     
Information delay: day  INFOLAGDAY 
    -1.007       
Information delay: week  INFOLAGWEEK 
-1.264*  -0.842*      0.489   
Information delay: month  INFOLAGMONTH 
1.369**      -0.750**     
Information delay: more than a 
month 
INFOLAGMOREMONTH 
    -1.011***       
Percentage of contracted sales 
(standardized)  
CNTRCT 
    -1.010***       
State-dependent price-setting  STATE 
1.867***  1.128***  -0.886**       
Number of direct competitors 
(standardized) 
COMPET 
0.318*  -0.378***    -0.399***     
Industry price leader indicator  PLI 
0.661*           
Price leadership indicator  PL 
0.312**          -1.992*** 
Constant  Constant 
-43.367  -73.013  -82.059  -93.555  -111.005  -95.263 
Log-likelihood function  ll 
48.019  29.51  46.853  46.652  11.302  26.348 
Chi-squared test  chi2             
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%    *** significant at 1% 
Notes:  (a) Scale variables are standardized for the estimation [(variable_value – mean)/(standard deviation)]. (b) The following were all insignificant in all six 
models: VARCOST, SLSCMPGNVI, PARENTCOMPANYVI, RWTRADE. 
(b) High-order parameters are included in the estimation for fit; their values are not included here because they have no immediate interpretation. 